





































Political theorists' recent interest in the topic of populism focuses mainly on two 
questions: 1) What is populism? i.e. the definition of the concept of populism itself 
and 2) What is the moral character of populism? i.e. should we understand populism 
as a negative or a positive political phenomenon.
Definitions of populism range from Cas Mudde's and Cristoval Rovira Kalt-
wasser's understanding of "populism as a thin-centered ideology" (Mudde and Kalt-
waser, 2017: 6), and John Judis arguing that populism is "not an ideology, but a po-
litical logic" (Judis, 2016: 11), Michael Kazin calling it a form of political "language" 
(Kazin, 1995: 1) to Ernesto Laclau talking about populism as a rhetoric and "mode 
of articulation" (Laclau, 2005b: 34). Although there is no consensus among contem-
porary political theorists on the definition of populism, two elements seem to play 
an essential role in most characterizations of populist politics: criticism of the elites 
and the populists' claim that they represent the true interests of the people (Mudde 
and Kaltwaser, 2017; Judis, 2016; Müller, 2016).
What is Wrong 
With PoPulism?
Abstract the main goal of this article is to explore the relationship between pop-
ulism and representative democracy. the paper is divided into two parts. in the 
first part, the paper offers a detailed analysis of the three criticisms of populism 
and the implications these criticisms have on our understanding of representative 
democracy. First, it addresses the argument that populism inevitably relies on dem-
agogy and it examines the inference this argument has on the concept of political 
representation in democracy. second, it discusses the claim that populism relies on 
the oversimplification of political issues and what this claim reveals about the dem-
ocratic ideal of the informed and politically responsible voter. the third criticism 
deals with the anti-pluralist character of populist politics, which, the paper argues, 
can also be extended to the concept of popular sovereignty itself. in the second 
part, the article looks more closely at the relationship between populism and repre-
sentative democracy. relying on the insights from the first part, it examines differ-
ent institutional restraints on the will of the majority and how populism redefines 
these restraints as anti-democratic and elitist barriers to popular will. Finally, the 
paper questions the prevailing view that sees populism as a phenomenon arising 
from the tension between liberal and democratic principles within representative 
democracy and offers an alternative framework for understanding the relationship 
between populism and democracy.
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Answers to the second question – What is the moral character of populism? 
– are wide-ranging. On the one end, there are authors who look at populist poli-
tics only in negative terms. For Jan Werner Müller populism represents "a degraded 
form of democracy" (Müller, 2016: 11), while Pierre Rosanvallon talks about pop-
ulism as "a perverse inversion of the ideals and procedures of representative de-
mocracy" (Rosanvallon, 2008: 265). On the other end, there are influential thinkers 
who look at populism in much more favorable light. Ernesto Laclau goes as far as 
calling populism an essence of politics and an idea that leads to democratization of 
democracy (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, Laclau, 2005a). Similarly, Christopher Lasch 
argues that populism is an "authentic voice of democracy" (Lasch, 1996: 106). Most 
authors, however, fall somewhere in the middle, pointing out both the negative and 
the positive aspects of populist politics and maintaining that "populism can work as 
either a threat to or a corrective for democracy" (Mudde and Kaltwaser, 2017: 76).1
The focus of this article somewhat departs from the questions of definition and 
moral character of populism that dominate contemporary debates by asking the fol-
lowing question: what can populism reveal about the nature of democracy itself? By 
posing this question, I follow Margaret Canovan who understands populism pri-
marily as a response to certain ambiguities that arise from democratic rule or, as she 
puts it, looking at populism as a "shadow cast by democracy" (Canovan, 1999: 3). 
However, I want to take her line of argument a step further and argue that populism 
dispels certain core presuppositions that define our understanding of the nature of 
representative democracy. Canovan's task is Tocquevillean in nature: it takes into 
account the complex relationship that exists between the good and the bad sides of 
democracy. To put it in another way, Canovan points out how certain faults in the 
character of the democratic Dr. Jekyll can lead to the rise of the populist Mr. Hyde. 
I, on the other hand, want to be a bit more dramatic and point out that, in fact, Dr. 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde are the same person all along. To achieve this, I will begin by 
asking the question: what is it that we find so disturbing about populist politics – or: 
What is wrong with populism? The central argument developed in this article is that 
by looking at some of the main problems that arise from the populist agenda, we can 
get a deeper insight into challenges facing representative democracy itself. In short, 
answering the question 'What is wrong with populism?' also reveals what is wrong 
with representative democracy.
The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I look at three criticism 
of populism and the implications these criticisms have on our understanding of 
representative democracy. First, I address the argument that populism inevitably 
relies on demagogy and the inference this argument has on the concept of politi-
cal representation in democracy. Second, I discussed the claim that populism relies 
on oversimplification of political issues and what this claim reveals about a demo-
cratic ideal of informed and politically responsible voter. Third criticism deals with 
 anti-pluralist character of populist politics, which, I will argue, can also be extended 
and applied to the concept of popular sovereignty itself. By discussing the inadequa-
cies of populist solutions we are offered a glimpse into cracks within the three pillars 
of representative democracy – the concept of political representation, the ideal of 
informed voter and the idea of popular sovereignty. In the second part I look more 
closely at the relationship between populism and representative democracy. I rely on 






































the insights from the first part of the article to explore this relationship by discussing 
different institutional restraints on the will of the majority and how populism rede-
scribes these restraints as anti-democratic and elitist barriers to popular will. Finally, 
I discuss the prevailing view that sees populism as a phenomenon arising from the 
tension that exist between liberal and democratic principles within representative 
democracy and offer an alternative framework for understanding the relationship 
between populism and democracy.
What is wrong with populism?
Populism as demagoguery
A comprehensive study published by the Center for European Studies and the Kon-
rad Adenauer Stiftung on the rise of populism in Europe bears the title Exposing the 
Demagogues (Grabow and Hartleb, 2013). What this title implies is a well-establi-
shed argument: populists are modern demagogues who, in their quest for political 
power, are ready to say whatever voters want to hear without ever planning to de-
liver on their promises once they come into power. Not only are populists involved 
in "various forms of political pandering", but, as true demagogues, they advocate 
"irresponsible policies" that often rely on xenophobic, anti-intellectual and exclusio-
nary political rhetoric (Müller, 2016: 15). Populists, the argument goes, are political 
conmen who, in their bid for power, exploit public resentment towards political, 
economic and intellectual elites by presenting themselves as true representatives of 
the will of the people. However, as one of the best-known novels written about po-
pulism – The Wonderful Wizard of Oz – warns us, there is no wizard at all, just a 
trickster hiding behind the curtain. The toxic rhetoric used by populists is nothing 
more than a ploy to gain public support and justify illiberal and exclusionary policy 
solutions.
In many cases, this is a fair description of populist politics. However, it is worth 
noting that this criticism rests on a presumption of a widespread public resentment 
against the perceived elites that populists are able to exploit. What political theorists 
often point out is that the rise of populism is fueled by the crisis of political represen-
tation. It is because voters feel that their interests are neglected by their elected rep-
resentatives that they turn to populist politicians and movements. As Yascha Mounk 
argues: "Elected by the people to represent their views, legislators have become in-
creasingly insulated from the popular will" (Mounk, 2018: 77). When discussing the 
causes of the rise in populism in contemporary liberal democracies, Francisco Paniz-
za recognizes three main causes (Panizza, 2005). First, when a political or social crisis 
is inadequately addressed or is left unresolved it leaves the impression among the 
voters that the ruling elite is unable or unwilling to tackle serious political challenges. 
The global economic crisis of 2008 or the EU's recent immigration crisis are good ex-
amples for events that prepared a fertile ground for populist demagogues. The second 
cause, Panizza argues, can be found in the exhaustion of dominant political traditions 
and the solutions they are offering. This has certainly been the case with numerous 
social democratic parties in Europe struggling to find adequate solutions for growing 
social inequality, the decrease in blue-collar jobs and the rising public debt. Unsur-
prisingly, many working-class voters that traditionally supported the social demo-
cratic option are now turning to populist parties. The third cause of rising populism is 

























lead to the loss of manufacturing jobs, the redundancy of unskilled workers and the 
general disruption in the economy and in social life.
In each of these three instances, there is a crisis of representation where elected 
officials and traditional political parties are perceived to be working against the interest 
of the majority of people by protecting the interest of the rich and influential few. This 
suggests that mainstream politicians are also demagogues: they told the voters what 
they wanted to hear to get into power, but once in power they act against the interest of 
those who elected them. We can assume that to get into power, politicians have to win 
the support of the majority of voters and therefore that they inevitably have to say what 
voters want to hear, but their inability or unwillingness to deliver what they promised is 
what leads to the crisis of representation and a strengthening of populism. Here, then, 
lies the irony: what gives rise to populist demagogues are mainstream demagogues. 
Populism finds fertile ground when elected representatives disappoint their voters by 
failing to deliver what they promised. The success of populists' condemnation of cor-
rupt and incompetent political elites and their bid as a "corrective" to liberal democracy 
rests on the idea that mainstream elites have become too remote from the people they 
are supposed to represent (Müller, 2016: 57). If we take this argument a step further 
we can conclude that the discrepancy between what is promised and what is delivered 
to the voters is a permanent feature of representative democracy. This is what Pierre 
Rosanvallon had in mind when he argues that "democracy suffers from a permanent 
crisis of representation" (Rosanvallon, 2006: 91).2 In democracy there will always be, 
to a smaller or larger extent, a divergence between what was promised and what was 
achieved. What the rise of populism reveals then, is that the core pillar of represen-
tative democracy – the idea of political representation – is often followed by its evil 
twin: demagogy. The critics of populism point out that the success of populist agenda 
frequently relies on shameless demagogy, but it is worth noting that by this very logic 
political representation provides a fertile soil for demagogues. Hence, the dangers of 
populist politics are the dangers that are inherent in representative democracy.
The criticism of populism as a form of demagoguery offers us two important 
insights. First, that populist demagoguery goes hand in hand with mainstream dem-
agoguery. Or to be more precise, it is the broken promises of mainstream dema-
gogues that drives the voters to give their support to populist demagogues. When 
political scientists try to explain the reasons for the recent rise in support for pop-
ulists, what they usually come up with is a list of unresolved political and social 
problems: a decline in living standards and a lack of job opportunities, especially for 
younger generations; rising social inequality; a rise in tax breaks and tax avoidance 
by wealthy corporations; a surge in the cost of housing, higher education and health 
services; a growth of public debt and inconsistent immigration policies. Unsurpris-
ingly, this results in a sharp decrease in the trust in governments and democratically 
elected representatives (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018; Mounk, 2018; Miller, 2018). As 
a result, there is growing support for populist politicians who condemn the corrupt 
governing elites and claim to be the true representatives of people's interests. There 
is a parasitism at play here: the success of populist demagogues depends, in the large 
part, on the failures of mainstream demagogues.3
2 A similar argument is put forward by James Miller: "the democratic project… is inherently 
unstable" (Miller, 2018: 10). 
3 For a description of a relationship between constitutional democracy and populism as a para-





































The second insight is that the problem of demagoguery in democracy is some-
thing that arises from the idea of political representation itself. The logic of dem-
ocratic representation dictates that to win power one has to win public support. 
Using demagoguery – either in its mainstream or populist guise – is often a success-
ful strategy in ensuring that support. Hence, the use of demagoguery as a political 
strategy is not endemic to populism, but inherent to representative democracy. This 
is the reason why the rhetorical attacks that mainstream politicians and populists 
launch at each other are often about who actually represents the true interests of the 
people. Each side depicts their opponents as con artists hiding behind the mask of 
representation while, in truth, pursuing their own private interests that are directly 
opposed to the welfare of the citizens. Often, unfortunately, both sides are correct in 
their assessment of their political opponents. Within the context of representative 
democracy, demagoguery is not an anomaly or a warning sign that democracy is 
going off the rails, but a permanent negative feature of political representation and 
democratic electoral process. Hence, the valid criticism of populist politics – that it 
is a form of demagoguery – also reveals the inherent problem with representative 
democracy itself.
Populism as simplification of politics
The second accusation put forward against populism is that populists not only say 
what voters want to hear, but also simplify the political language, thus transforming 
it in a dangerous way. What they offer to the public is a simplified view of politics in 
which scheming elites conspire against the interests of the majority. In their version 
of the world complex political and social challenges always have simple and straight-
forward solutions and the diversity of voters' interests and values is buried under the 
idea of a homogenous will of the people.
When discussing populist strategies, Rosanvallon talks about three different lev-
els of simplification (Rosanvallon, 2011). First, there is the simplification of policy 
challenges and solutions. Populists tend to present complex issues such as immigra-
tion, climate change, economic stability or security vs. privacy in the simplest terms 
and offer uncomplicated solutions to these issues. These solutions often show dis-
regard for scientific or expert opinion. Additionally, when presenting their policies, 
they often exploit existing prejudices or xenophobic and exclusionary sentiments. 
Talking about "the oversimplification of policy challenges", Müller gives an exam-
ple of promotional posters by Front National in France claiming that "Two Million 
Unemployed Is Two Million Immigrants Too Many!" (Müller, 2016: 27, 17). Further 
examples would be the claims of the former US President Donald Trump that health 
care reform is simple or that building a wall between the US and Mexico is an easy 
solution to the problem of illegal immigration. The second strategy of simplification 
depicts politics as a Manichean world divided between corrupt, self-serving elites 
and honest common people interested in the public good. The complexity of power 
relations that exists between different classes, social groups and interest groups is 
replaced by a simple us vs. them worldview. The third type of simplification that 
populists rely on is talking about people's will as a homogenous concept where all 
the diversity of opinions, attitudes and values that exists in a democratic society is 
replaced by a congruent vox populi. Furthermore, populists claim not only that there 
is such a thing as a single will of the people, but that their own political agenda best 

























out, diminish our public discourse and turn citizens against each other, transform-
ing the cooperative process of collective decision-making into an antagonistic friend 
vs. enemy political framework (Rosanvallon, 2011).
Rosanvallon's criticism of populism is justified. However, for this line of argu-
ment to work, we have to assume that there is an audience that finds convincing the 
simplified view of politics that populists are peddling. This is what Mudde and Kalt-
wasser call the supply and demand problem: it is not enough that we have populists 
trying to distort our political reality by simplified re-descriptions; we also need citi-
zens who embrace these re-descriptions. As Mudde and Kaltwasser argue: "to expla-
in the success (and failure) of populist actors one has to take into account both the 
demand side and the supply side of populist politics" (Mudde i Kaltwaser, 2017: 97). 
Hence, the danger that the populist strategy of simplification will lead to the impo-
verishment of our public discourse becomes real only when enough voters embrace 
this kind of rhetoric. Let me illustrate this by discussing populists' use of the Mani-
chean "us vs. them" strategy.4 When populists offer such a simplified worldview, it 
only becomes politically relevant when enough of the voters start subscribing to this 
worldview. What then becomes the main question is this: How does the crisis of rep-
resentation, followed by fear and resentment against those in power lead informed 
voters to accept the populist worldview? I, as a voter might be convinced that some 
of the political elite works against the interests of the majority of citizens, but it does 
not follow from this that voters will necessarily embrace the simplified Manichean 
worldview. Alternative responses to this sense of betrayal can range from political 
apathy to activism, political mobilization or a need for a deeper analysis and un-
derstanding of the problem. The crisis of representation does not inevitably lead 
to support for populist agenda. For that to happen there has to be enough citizens 
convinced by the "us vs. them" explanation of our political world. The logic of this 
argument applies not only to the "us vs. them" simplification strategy, but also to 
the oversimplification of policy solutions and the idea of a single will of the people. 
In all three instances, the populists' supply of simplified political explanations and 
solutions has to be met with a demand for such explanations and solutions.
Therefore, following the logic of the supply and demand argument, we must 
either 1) explain how well-informed and politically responsible voters are trans-
formed into gullible voters who embrace this kind of simplified view of politics or 
2) question how well-informed and politically responsible these voters were in the 
first place. In his influential study of populism, Mounk clearly embraces the second 
option: "voters do not like to think that the world is complicated. They certainly 
do not like to be told that there is no immediate answer to their problems. Faced 
with politicians who seem to be less and less able to govern an increasingly complex 
world, many are increasingly willing to vote for anybody who promises a simple 
solution". That is why, Mounk concludes, "glib, facile solutions stand at the very 
heart of the populist appeal" (Mounk, 2018: 38). Mounk's depressing view of the 
average democratic voter's susceptiveness to populists' simplified world-view is sup-
ported by a substantial amount of empirical research. Political scientists in the past 
several decades have consistently shown that the majority of voters in democracies 
are badly informed and sometimes blatantly ignorant about basic facts regarding 
policy issues, the workings of political institutions and general information about 
political and social issues (Converse, 1990; Bartels, 1996; Friedman, 2006; Somin, 





































2013; Achen and Bartels, 2017). This, in turn, can lead to a simplified view of politi-
cal solutions to complex political problems.
What both the empirical studies and the voters' support for the populist strategy 
of simplification suggest is that one of the basic presumptions on which representa-
tive democracy rests – the informed and responsible voter – is a myth. The idea that 
the majority of citizens participating in democratic elections are well-informed and 
politically responsible is one of the core pillars of democratic order. The justification 
of democratic collective decision-making rests on this very idea. However, the jus-
tified criticism of populist politics of simplification points not only to the dangers 
of embracing the populist agenda, but also reveals that our image of a rational, in-
telligent, well-informed and responsible democratic citizen might be an illusion. If 
the vast majority of citizens reject the populists' attempts to simplify our political 
reality, then populist movements are condemned to exist on the fringes of a stable 
democratic society. The fact that the populist strategy of simplification is proving to 
be a successful way to attract voters in both old and new democracies has a sober-
ing effect on our unrealistic vision of the average democratic voter. Again, looking 
critically at populism results in an uncomfortable insight into one of the central 
assumptions of representative democracy.
Populism as anti-pluralism
The third criticism I want to discuss addresses the populist claim that their voice is 
the voice of the people and that the solutions they offer are the embodiment of the 
true will of the people. Not only does this claim, as Rosanvallon points out, rest on a 
simplified view of a democratic public, but its implications are profoundly anti-plu-
ralist and exclusionary. It is this claim that Müller finds to be the most dangerous as-
pect of populist politics because it rests on the deep anti-pluralistic assumption that 
people should be thought of as one. "The core claim of populism", warns Müller, "is 
thus a moralized form of anti-pluralism" (Müller, 2016: 23). When we describe the 
concept of people as a homogenous whole, what follows is that those who disagree 
with the will of the majority can be excluded from that concept. The next step for 
populists, who present themselves as representatives of the true voice of the people, 
is to exclude all those who disagree with their politics as not being "a proper part of 
the people" (ibid.: 9) or worse, as the enemy of the people. This, as Müller points out, 
is "an exclusionary form of identity politics" (ibid.) where the core value central to 
identity politics – that of inclusion – is inverted on its head.
Canovan explains how populists exploit the ambiguity in the concept of "the 
people". We can think of the concept of "the people", Canovan argues, in three dis-
tinct ways:
– people as a whole-body politic
– people as an ethno-cultural community
– people as common people / as plebs (Canovan, 2005; see also: Canovan, 
2004).
The maneuver that populist use in their praise of the people and the condemna-
tion of the corrupt elites is to equate the first conception – people as a whole – to the 
third conception – people as simple, uncorrupted people. (in the case of nationalist 
populism, all 3 conceptions are equated). This inevitably leads to the politics of ex-
clusion where those who disagree with the populist worldview – let's say the liberal 

























moral rather than a demographic category. Canovan's argument is supported by 
Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, who point out that populism's core claims 
are based on a stark contrast between "corrupt and distant elites" and their own 
"attempt to make the popular will heard and acted on" by defending "the interests of 
the plain, ordinary people" (Eatwell and Goodwill, 2018: 78). The inevitable result 
is that those who disagree with this simplistic Manichean contrast are branded as 
either members of the corrupt elite or enablers of such an elite and are, therefore, 
not part of the people.
I agree that this is a fair criticism of populism, but I believe the problem cuts 
deeper than Müller, Eatwell, Goodwin or even Canovan suggest. This criticism 
questions the coherence of one of the core ideas of representative democracy – that 
of popular sovereignty. The concept of the people as a body politic, the concept on 
which the idea of popular sovereignty is based upon, is itself anti-pluralist and ex-
clusionary. This becomes clearer if we look at the idea of popular sovereignty within 
the context of representative democracy as an answer to two distinct questions. The 
first question is: who is the true source of political authority? The second one is: who 
rules and for whose benefit? The answer to the first question is: the people and to the 
second one: the representatives of the people for the benefit of the people. However, 
if we look at these answers more closely, we can see that in both cases we operate 
with the definition of the people as a homogenous entity whose individual members 
have identical interests and concerns. Our answers inevitably led us into the trap of 
exclusion. Therefore, unless we subscribe to the Rousseauan anti-pluralist ideal of 
volonté générale, it becomes clear that we are talking about the concept of the peo-
ple in a meta-political, symbolic kind of way. This is what Jürgen Habermas meant 
when he said that the idea of the single, homogeneous, authentic people is a fantasy, 
and that people can only appear in plural (Habermas, 1996). The moment we start 
thinking of the people as a homogenous whole – that is in anti-pluralist terms – we 
embrace some form of the politics of exclusion.
The same logic applies when answering the second question: who rules and for 
whose benefit? Here, we assume that a functioning representative democracy pro-
tects the interest of the people by defending, balancing, and compromising between 
the interests of different social groups – people in plural – rather than the people 
as a homogeneous whole. Very rarely do governments have a chance to introduce 
political solutions and public policies that benefit each and every citizen equally. 
Here again, the claim that the government represents the interest of the people is a 
symbolic statement because in most cases it is impossible to promote the interests of 
all the people or people as a whole. In answering this second question, Habermas's 
insight rings even more true: people can only appear in plural. Populists, in that 
sense, are consistent: catering for the interest of the (true) people inevitably entails 
excluding some parts of the population from the people.
More concretely, the process of exclusion in representative democracy man-
ifest itself in two different ways. First, there is a membership exclusion, i.e. demos 
is defined, first and foremost, by defining who is in and who is out. Second is a 
decision-making exclusion where the will of the majority is described as the will of 
the people, while that of the minority is disregarded. An obvious historical example 
of membership exclusion, one that Müller cites, is the Jacobins and their politics of 
terror, which invoked the will of the people to justify the prosecution of their ide-
ological opponents as the enemies of the people (Müller, 2016: 59-60). However, 





































also invoked the concept of the people in an exclusionary manner. Here, of course, 
I am referring to the American Revolution and the Republic's Founding Fathers' 
opening phrase of the Declaration of the Independence: "We the People". This has 
always been perceived in a much more positive light than the terror of the French 
Revolution. The US concept of "We the People" not only excluded Native-Americans 
and black slaves, but also the British loyalists who opposed the independence of the 
colonies. In fact, sixty thousand of them had their land confiscated and were forced 
to move to Canada or England. (This is how Thomas Paine got his house and land 
from the newly established US government.) This type of exclusion was not only a 
feature of the American or the French Rrepublic but, as Mounk acknowledges, nati-
on building in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries "nearly always took the form of a 
hankering for ethnic purity as well as democracy" (Mounk, 2018: 163). I do not want 
to suggest that representative democracies are inevitably exclusionary, but historical 
records show that the use of the concept of the people in democracies, as a way to 
justify excluding certain groups of people from membership, is not unique to popu-
lists. Rather, my argument is that invoking the ideal of the people as a homogenous 
whole – in its populist, republican, liberal or conservative guise – is the first step in 
the politics of exclusion.
The second type of exclusion in democracies – decision-making exclusion – is 
also not unique to populism. The core assumption of representative democracy is 
that in free societies citizens will unavoidably disagree not only on policy issues, but 
also on their understanding of the political community they want to live in. As John 
Rawls points out in Political Liberalism, pluralism "is the normal result of the exercise 
of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional 
democratic regime" (Rawls, 1993: xviii). That is why whenever somewhere nearly 100 
percent of voters elect a candidate or agree on an answer to a referendum question, 
we rightly assume that the voting process was rigged and that we are talking about 
an autocracy rather than a democracy. In representative democracy the will of the 
people is never uniform. However, for procedural reasons we equate the will of the 
majority with the will of the people. What inevitably follows is that the will of those 
who are in disagreement with the majority is ignored when defining what the will of 
the people decided. An obvious recent example to this is the Brexit vote, where out 
of 72,2% of the electorate that voted, 51, 9% that voted "yes", was referred later, by 
both supporters and the opponents of the Brexit, as the true will of the British people.
The criticism of populism as anti-pluralist and exclusionary is on point. How-
ever, it is worth noting that populist exclusionary politics arises not from some per-
verse or corrupt understanding of the concept of people, but that this concept is 
anti-pluralist in its very nature. Whenever we invoke the idea of the people as a 
homogenous whole in democracy beyond its symbolic form – as is the case with 
membership exclusion or decision-making exclusion – we almost inevitably dismiss 
or discriminate against some of our fellow citizens. Here lies the danger of answer-
ing the question "Who rules?" by saying: The people do. This is the reason why Hans 
Kelsen, in his rejection of Carl Schmitt's idea of the homogenous people as a basis of 
political order – called the people "a meta-political illusion" (Kelsen, 1981: 22).5 It is 
5 See also Urbinati, 2017: 44: "powerful myth with which democracy was born… myth that 
representative system tried to reproduce, in fiction, at the symbolic and indirect level: the 
myth of the perfect unity of the collective sovereign endowed with a single will"; and Morgan's 
argument on the logic of popular sovereignty which implies that the people can strive for "the 

























this illusion, however, that is one of the constitutive elements of the democratic the-
ory of legitimacy. The very idea of popular sovereignty is not a populist invention, 
but a core pillar of representative democracy. Populists are only pushing this idea 
to its logical exclusionary conclusion. Achieving a stable, inclusionary and pluralist 
representative democracy requires that we curtail the idea of popular sovereignty 
and refer to it as a symbolic, rather than an operational concept. Once again, the 
criticism of populism reveals a deep problem with the idea that lies at the heart of 
representative democracy – that of popular sovereignty.
To sum up, in this part of the paper, I have demonstrated how contemporary 
criticism of populism leads to the unmasking of the cracks in the three pillars that 
our understanding of representative democracy stands on – that of representation, 
responsible voters and popular sovereignty. To refer back to the analogy from the 
introduction, looking at the vices of the populist Mr. Hyde I illustrated the question-
able character traits of democratic Dr. Jekyll. In what follows, I will further explore 
the relationship between populism and representative democracy.
The relationship between populism  
and representative democracy
If my central argument is correct – that populism is a negative manifestation of 
democracy's own myths – does it make sense to contrast representative democra-
cy and populism in such stark terms? If the challenges of demagoguery, ignorance 
and irresponsibility of voters and the exclusionary nature of popular sovereignty are 
permanent fellow travelers of representative democracy, why did populism have to 
surge to reveal these shortcomings?
The answer lies in the institutional mechanisms that representative democra-
cies have put in place to avoid these challenges. It is through these mechanisms 
that democracy tries to protect itself from its own myths. Here I am referring to 
mechanisms such as institutional checks and balances, an independent media, ex-
pert policymakers, political parties and policies of minority representation and in-
clusion. The main purpose of the system of checks and balances (especially the in-
dependent judiciary) is to prevent a concentration of political power in one branch 
of a government, but also to ensure pluralism and the protection of the rights of 
all citizens by curtailing the will of the majority. Similarly, political parties are not 
only a mechanism to mobilize and politically organize voters, but also to ensure re-
sponsible governance by providing viable alternatives to current officeholders. They 
represent the plurality of different interests that exist within the society and filter 
citizens' demands into coherent policies.6 The role of the independent media is to 
provide information necessary for citizens to make rational and informed decisions, 
but also to unmask demagoguery and give a platform to the plurality of voices in a 
democratic society. The involvement of experts in designing public policies is even 
more explicitly aimed at rejecting simplified, exclusionary or scientifically unfound-
ed political solutions advocated by demagogues and embraced by uninformed or ir-
to Robert Michels, Max Weber claimed "Such notions as 'will of the people' and 'genuine will 
of the people' have long since ceased to exist for me; they are fictions" (see: Miller, 2018: 168). 
6 As Miller argues: "Throughout Europe, the rise of the party system contributed to a gradual 
process of democratization, involving the slow expansion of the franchise, the institutional-
ization of civil liberties, and the emergence of a central government accountable to voters, 





































responsible voters. Specifically, policies addressing the political and social inclusion 
of minorities – such as quotas for minority representatives or different multicultural 
policies – address both the membership and decision-making exclusion aspects of 
popular sovereignty.
It is worth noting that all of these mechanisms are undemocratic, but not nece-
ssarily anti-democratic. What I mean is that they are designed to curtail and limit the 
will of the majority, therefore, they are undemocratic. However, that does not mean 
that they are anti-democratic, i.e. intended to work against the interests and the 
welfare of the majority of citizens. Actually, a functioning and stable representative 
democracy uses these undemocratic mechanisms for the benefit of its citizens and 
the maintenance of democracy itself. Here we can draw a parallel between represen-
tative democracy and the free market as an efficient system of property exchange. 
A completely unregulated market would collapse on itself by creating monopolies, 
unsustainable levels of social inequalities, overproduction, non-provision of public 
goods, lack of consumer protection, negative externalities, etc. Similarly, represen-
tative democracy has to rely on the abovementioned undemocratic mechanisms to 
ensure its own survival. A democracy that puts no limits on the will of the majori-
ty would quickly stop being democratic. As Nadia Urbinati convincingly argues, a 
democratic system that would allow the majority to exclude political options with 
minority support from political competition, "that infringes basic political rights 
– especially the rights crucial for forming opinions and judgments, expressing dis-
sents, and changing views – and that systematically precludes the possibility of the 
formation of the new majorities is not a democracy at all" (Urbinati, 2019: 10).
That being said, it is possible that some of these undemocratic mechanisms that 
were initially designed to make representative democracies both stable and truly re-
presentative became distorted and utilized in an anti-democratic way. This happens 
when there is a shift from policies designed for the benefit and welfare of the citi-
zens to policies that promote special interests at the expense of everyone else within 
the political community. Authors like Laclau and Rancière describe this process as 
a transformation of representative democracy to elective oligarchy (Laclau, 2007; 
Rancière, 2006). In the glory days of representative democracy – from the post-war 
period to the 70's – the abovementioned undemocratic mechanisms were, in a large 
part, used in a way that led to an increase in economic prosperity, a decrease in so-
cial inequality and a rise in equality of opportunity, living standards and better and 
more inclusive public services. The general success of these policies gave legitimacy 
to both political elites and experts, as well as validity to their claim that they repre-
sent the interest of the people. Eatwell and Goodwin refer to this period as the Gol-
den Age of Capitalism "when prosperity was widely enjoyed" (Eatwell & Goodwin, 
2018: 189), while Mounk describes it as "the period of democratic stability" when 
"most citizens enjoyed a rapid increase in their living standards" (Mounk, 2018: 15). 
From the 1970's on, however, we can witness how undemocratic limits on the will 
of the majority slowly transform into an anti-democratic promotion of oligarchic 
interests at the expense of the public's welfare.7 Political parties became more depen-
dent on big corporate donors and powerful interest lobbies. Laws and court rulings 
7 As John Dunn claims: "For much of the post-war period across North America, Western 
Europe, and Japan, it saw protracted periods of relative felicity as economies grew, welfare 
systems were extended, and the lives of most citizens visibly improved along with them. By 
2000 at the latest that was no longer clearly the case, the rewards of residual growth were 

























reflected oligarchic agenda through policies of deregulation, privatization, tax cuts 
and cuts in public spending. The mainstream media became more ideologically bi-
ased and often focused on promoting the interests of big money. All of this resulted 
in an increase in economic and social inequality, followed by a decrease in equality 
of opportunity and social mobility, a deepening of political polarization and elected 
officials' further detachment from their constituents.
Populism thrives on the failures of representative democracy. Populists will 
point out that corrupt politicians and technocratic elites, by disregarding the will of 
the people (i.e. will of the majority), inevitably also disregard the interest of the peo-
ple. What makes this claim more or less convincing depends, in large part, on how 
successful the undemocratic mechanisms are in actually ensuring the welfare of the 
majority of citizens. As Mounk points out, for many citizens in democratic societies 
the support for liberal democratic institutions in large part depends not on the ab-
stract ideals of justice, but on the outcomes these institutions deliver (Mounk, 2018: 
131). However, populists go a step further: their core argument is that undemocratic 
mechanisms designed to limit the popular will are intrinsically anti-democratic. By 
invoking a minimalist concept of democracy where the only criteria for evaluating 
a certain policy or a political decision as correct and just is to see if it corresponds 
to the will of the majority, populists can claim that decisions made by the elites – 
professional politicians, judges, policy experts and technocrats – are by definition 
anti-democratic. "In light of the populist ideal of the people ruling themselves", Amy 
Gutmann points out, "any constraints on popular rule are undemocratic even if, all 
things considered, the constraints are justified" (Gutmann, 2007: 532). The populist 
argument is not about outcomes, i.e. assessing if check and balances, political par-
ties, mainstream media or experts designing public policies are actually benefiting 
citizens. Rather, it is about the very nature of decision-making: any institution or 
practice designed to limit the will of the people is, at its core, anti-democratic. The-
refore, for populists, there is no point in trying to restore undemocratic mechanisms 
that limit the will of the people in a way that would promote the interests of all 
citizens. Their mission is not to restore representative democracy by curtailing the 
oligarchic influence on collective decision-making process. On the contrary, populi-
sm's goal is to destroy any undemocratic constraints on the sovereignty of the people 
by introducing the policies that represent the will of the 'true' people. Populists are 
more than willing to pay the price of achieving this goal: the emergence of the dark 
side of democracy through shameless demagoguery, anti-intellectual worship of the 
wisdom of the 'common man' and embracing the anti-pluralist and exclusionary 
concept of the people.
The evidence for this kind of populist strategy has been well documented by 
theorists like Müller (2016) and Urbinati (2019) in their analysis of populists in 
power. Once populist movements manage to win elections, they act quickly to dis-
mantle any institutional limits on the democratic will of the 'true' people. The checks 
and balances system is eroded by limiting the powers of the independent judiciary 
or by packing the courts with judges known to be loyal to the new government. 
Parliamentary opposition is demonized as traitors to the people. The independent 
media becomes 'fake news', while state-run media is put under the control of editors 
and journalists sympathetic to the populist government. The opinions of experts 
are dismissed as biased and disconnected from the will of the people. The politics 
of compromise and balancing of different interests that exist within the society are 





































sions of a populist leader. There is an abundance of examples for this kind of popu-
list strategy from both the left – such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela – and the right 
– such as Berlusconi in Italy, Fidesz in Hungary, PIS in Poland or Trump in the USA.
The populist strategy of equating undemocratic constraints on the popular will 
with anti-democratic dangers of representative democracy also explains why it is 
often futile to try and convince disappointed citizens with populist sympathies to 
rely on the authority of experts – courts, scientists, policy experts, professional jo-
urnalists, etc. – when trying to make informed political decisions. From a populist 
perspective, the authority of these experts is a priori problematic because their un-
democratic role in the public sphere is to question and limit the will of the people. 
Therefore, whatever agenda these experts are promoting can only lead to anti-demo-
cratic outcomes. Their authority is suspect not because of their lack of real expertise, 
but because of their motives: their aim is to promote elitist and oligarchic interests at 
the expense of the interest of the people. Within this context, invoking policy exper-
tise as a solution to the representation crisis can actually help populists – as the pu-
blic outcry against experts in both the period after the 2008 economic crisis, debates 
on Brexit or current opposition to Covid vaccines suggest. The expert policymakers 
and mainstream opinion-makers can now be seen – as populists are quick to point 
out – as part of the problem, not as part of the solution. Consequently, experts' criti-
cism of populist rhetoric and policies as demagogy, as a dangerous simplification of 
complex political and social issues and as politics of exclusion can be easily dismi-
ssed as unfounded and biased. The attack on the elites in populist rhetoric serves a 
dual purpose: first, to mobilize popular support by identifying the political, econo-
mic, intellectual and cultural elites as oligarchic villains and, second, to deflect any 
criticism of populist agenda as a part of an elitist ploy to deprive the people of their 
rule. This can help explain the paradox at the heart of populist politics: responding 
to the elective oligarchy's anti-democratic disregard of people's interest by relying 
on an anti-democratic exclusion of all those who are critical of populist goals. As 
Urbinati points out: "populism expresses two things at the same time: the denun-
ciation of exclusion, on the one hand, and the constitution of a strategy of inclusion 
by means of exclusion (of the establishment)" (Urbinati, 2019: 33). This negative 
description of populist agenda holds regardless of our definition of populism (as an 
ideology, political logic, rhetoric or a mere strategy).
Based on these insights, what kind of conclusions can we draw on the relation-
ship between populism and representative democracy? One way to look at this rela-
tionship is through the lens of the underlying tension between the liberal and dem-
ocratic elements that constitute both the normative and the institutional structure 
of constitutional democracies. This two-strand model of democracy is advocated by 
Chantal Mouffe in The Democratic Paradox when she argues: "On one side we have 
the liberal tradition constituted by the rule of law, the defense of human rights and 
the respect of individual liberty; on the other the democratic tradition whose main 
ideas are those of equality, identity between governing and governed and popular 
sovereignty. There is no necessary relation between those two distinct traditions but 
only a contingent historical articulation" (Mouffe, 2000: 2). In a later text, she talks 
about the "necessary tension which exists between the logic of liberalism [individual 
liberty and pluralism] and the logic of democracy [popular sovereignty and equa-
lity], and the impossibility of a final reconciliation" (Mouffe, 2005: 53). A similar 
argument is put forward by Steven Levistky and Daniel Ziblatt: "An overreliance of 

























ignore the rank and file and fail to represent the people. But an overreliance on the 
'will of the people' can also be dangerous, for it can lead to the election of a dema-
gogue who threatened democracy itself ". Their conclusion is that "there is no escape 
from this tension. There are always trade-offs" (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018: 34). This 
two-strand view rests on a presupposition that there is an integral and unresolva-
ble tension between the liberal and democratic values at the heart of representative 
democracy. The best we can hope to achieve is a stable balancing act that manages 
to restrain the excesses of popular will through undemocratic institutional mecha-
nisms without sacrificing the interest of the people in the process. Populism grows 
in strength when this balancing act fails, i.e. when liberal restraints on popular will 
result in the promotion of narrow oligarchic interests at the expense of the interest 
of the majority. In this view, populism can have a corrective role by restoring the 
balance by strengthening the democratic side. The danger is that populism can tip 
the balance too far to the democratic side, which can result in anti-pluralist and 
exclusionary politics.8
There is, however, another way we can understand the relationship between 
populism and the ideal of representative democracy. The argument that I have 
put forward in this article is that democracy is haunted by certain vulnerabilities 
that are imbedded in its very core: political representation invoking demagoguery; 
voters embracing ill informed, irresponsible or discriminatory political solutions; 
and the realization of the ideal of popular sovereignty leading to exclusionary and 
 anti-pluralist outcomes. If left unrestrained through different institutional mech-
anism – rule of law, checks and balances, political parties, expert policy making, 
independent media – these democratic vulnerabilities will abolish democracy itself. 
In this reading, these undemocratic restraints or gatekeepers, are not liberal impo-
sitions on the true spirit of democracy, but necessary mechanisms for democracy's 
survival. It would be naïve to think that these mechanisms can never be abused for 
anti-democratic purposes, i.e. for promoting oligarchic interests or specific interest 
groups at the expense of the good of the majority. After all, that is exactly a tendency 
we have witnessed in many democratic societies in the last half a century. However, 
that does not mean that the liberal elements took a precedence over democratic 
elements in liberal-democratic regimes, but that liberal gatekeeping has failed in its 
task by distorting the necessary and justified undemocratic restraints on popular will 
into anti-democratic disregard for public good.
How should we evaluate populism then? Populism can help us reveal these 
democratic vulnerabilities in the same way that Mr. Hyde reveals the repressed na-
ture of Dr. Jekyll. However, populism is neither the corrective, not the adequate 
cure for stopping the transformation of representative democracy to elective oligar-
chy. A reason for this is that populism equates undemocratic restraints on popular 
will with the anti-democratic interest of the elites to exclude the majority of citizens 
from a meaningful decision-making process. By rejecting undemocratic restraints, 
populism embraces the demagoguery, anti-pluralism and exclusionary politics of 
the uninhibited Mr. Hyde of democracy. The populist solution to saving democracy 
results, in the best-case scenario, in an anti-pluralist tyranny of the majority and, 
in the worst and more likely scenario, in an autocratic concentration of power in 
8 For criticism of this two-strain model of democracy, see Canovan's essay "Trust the People!" 
where she argues that this model "seems to imply that however weak populists may be as 






































the hand of one party and one leader posing as an embodiment of the true will 
of the people. Once in power, populist leaders and movements prove that if the 
abovementioned democratic vulnerabilities are allowed to blossom without any re-
straints, democracy collapses on itself. The populist cure for the oligarchic threat to 
democracy results, paradoxically, in the destruction of democracy. Therefore, on 
this view of democratic ethos there is no such thing as an illiberal democracy or 
oligarchic liberalism. If we accept that the core principle of liberal philosophy is 
treating all persons as free and equal then the promotion of narrow oligarchic and 
elitist interests while disregarding the interests and welfare of the rest of the citizens 
directly violates this principle. Similarly, a populist democracy that abandons liberal 
constraints on popular will inevitably stops being a real democracy once it embraces 
the politics of exclusion by identifying its supporters as the true people and its critics 
as the enemies of the people. Here, in conclusion, we have an answer to the question 
of what is wrong with populism. Populism is the face of the dark side of democracy 
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Što ne valja s populizmom?
Sažetak glavni je cilj ovog članka istražiti odnos između populizma i predstavničke 
demokracije. rad je podijeljen u dva dijela. u prvom dijelu rad nudi detaljnu ana-
lizu triju kritika populizma i implikacija koje te kritike imaju na naše razumijevanje 
predstavničke demokracije. Prvo, bavi se argumentom da se populizam neizbježno 
oslanja na demagogiju i ispituje posljedice koje ovaj argument za koncept politič-
kog predstavljanja u demokraciji. Drugo, raspravlja se o tvrdnji da se populizam 
oslanja na pretjerano pojednostavljenje političkih pitanja i onome što ta tvrdnja 
otkriva o demokratskom idealu informiranog i politički odgovornog birača. treća 
se kritika bavi antipluralističkim karakterom populističke politike, koja se, tvrdi se u 
radu, može proširiti i na sam koncept narodne suverenosti. u drugom dijelu, članak 
se pobliže bavi odnosom populizma i predstavničke demokracije. oslanjajući se na 
uvide iz prvog dijela, ispituje se različita institucionalna ograničenja volje većine i 
kako populizam ta ograničenja redefinira kao antidemokratske i elitističke prepreke 
narodnoj volji. Konačno, rad propituje prevladavajuće stajalište koje drži da je po-
pulizam fenomen koji proizlazi iz napetosti između liberalnih i demokratskih načela 
unutar predstavničke demokracije te nudi alternativni okvir za razumijevanje odno-
sa između populizma i demokracije.
Ključne riječi populizam, predstavnička demokracija, demagogija, narodna suve-
renost, narod
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